The previous jokes are full of satire, sarcasm, teasing, and ridicule, profoundly reflecting the political and social realities of the Soviet Union. Although this is a cynical expression, it also reflects the tenacious fighting spirit of the Soviet people. The existence of these jokes proves that no matter how the Soviet authorities whitewashed and covered the cruel truth with beautiful lies, at least the Soviet people were “sober”. It is these jokes that make us realize that the highest level of jokes never needs deliberate creation. It truly originates from reality yet transcends reality. In my personal opinion, Soviet political jokes can be regarded as a valuable cultural heritage of humanity in the 20th century. They are daggers and javelins. Perhaps we cannot say that they killed a bloody path in the dark, but at least they shed some light in the dark.
Gorbachev is the last leader. Overall, the jokes of this period are markedly different from previous eras. Satirical jokes must have a target or object of attack. In the past three eras, the target of Soviet jokes was mainly the Soviet system, power, police, social control and ideological shackles. In other words, these jokes did have a strong political color. But in the Gorbachev era, the target of Soviet jokes underwent a big change. Many jokes were aimed at economic phenomena or social phenomena. Jokes specifically targeting Gorbachev himself were few. But the Soviet Union was after all the Soviet Union. These bizarre economic and social phenomena were, after all, peculiar products of the peculiar Soviet system. So these jokes still had political nature.
However, even so, looking back at the full six years of the Gorbachev era, the output and quality of jokes were not high. The golden age of Soviet jokes had passed. There are two main reasons for this: First, let's look at the previous three eras. They were either violent and overbearing, stupid and ignorant, or old and muddled, which are excellent materials for generating jokes. But Gorbachev, setting aside his personal abilities for the moment, at least he did not have these characteristics. Second, although Gorbachev made mistakes repeatedly in his reforms, his two reform programs of "glasnost" (openness) and "perestroika" (restructuring) were not just empty slogans. He really tried hard, and no matter how badly he did, he allowed the public to voice criticisms. And once people can discuss openly, they no longer need to tell jokes to vent their suppressed emotions.
In 1985, Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party. In less than a year, he launched his reform program: accelerate strategy. In fact, objectively speaking, the accelerate strategy was not proposed by Gorbachev. His predecessors Andropov and Chernenko had already used the term "accelerate" in various reports. But Gorbachev expanded the scope of the accelerate strategy. He once said: The accelerate development strategy refers to revolutionary measures both in material terms and in spiritual terms, and politics undoubtedly takes first place in the revolutionary process. That is to say, accelerate was no longer limited to the fields of technology and society, but also expanded to the more important and fundamental political field. Only by changing the political reality of the Soviet Union could the accelerate development of economy and society be achieved.
Under the guidance of this thinking, Gorbachev then proposed "glasnost" (openness) and "perestroika" (restructuring). Compared with the previous eras, these two programs can be said to be sweeping reforms. Gorbachev was declaring war on the powerful historical inertia. Then the question came, how dare he? A very critical point is that Gorbachev entered the power center very late. In 1978, Gorbachev was still a local official in the North Caucasus region. It was not until that summer that he was called to Moscow and promoted to Secretary of the Central Committee. Thereafter, Gorbachev went smoothly all the way. In March 1985 he was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and became the supreme leader of the Soviet Union. Thus, Gorbachev became the first supreme leader of the Soviet Union who had not participated in World War II. Moreover, Gorbachev was relatively young at the time, only 54 years old. Many Soviets believed that Gorbachev's rise meant the end of “old men's politics” in the Soviet Union.
There was a joke about it:
Q: Who supported Gorbachev in the Politburo? A: He didn't need any support, he could walk by himself.
You see, this is the characteristic of Gorbachev-era jokes. Many were not aimed at Gorbachev, but were still teasing and satirizing the past. Because of his relatively short time entering the power center, plus the relatively unstable political environment in the Soviet center after Brezhnev's death, Gorbachev had not yet degenerated into a sly old politician. He had not become self-indulgent and stagnant, but rather had the courage to challenge tradition.
On the other hand, Gorbachev personally experienced the corruption and stagnation during the Brezhnev era, which was also a major factor in his determination to reform. At that time, Gorbachev and many other Soviet leaders realized that the Soviet Union's political bureaucratization and economic ossification seriously hindered economic development. As one of only two superpowers in the world, the Soviet Union even faced a serious food supply crisis. The economic downturn further led to contradictions and exacerbated social problems between the various classes and nationalities in the Soviet Union. What was more dangerous was that the Soviet people had been tortured without confidence. No matter how nicely you speak, I won't believe you. The Soviet ideology was declining rapidly. But in the face of this situation, the Soviet rulers sank deeper and deeper into the pervasive decadence, unable to extricate themselves. What to do? Gorbachev had no choice but to reform. Of course, there were different ways to reform. Broadly speaking, Gorbachev had three options: One was to innovate the traditional ideology to meet new development needs; The second was to quietly replace the traditional ideology with Russian nationalism; The third was to return to Stalinism in some form, establish absolute authority through strongman politics, and thereby transform political reality and reunite the Soviet people.
Of course, in fact, Gorbachev chose the first option, innovating the traditional ideology, namely the so-called openness and restructuring. This choice is also easy to understand. Gorbachev was born in 1931 and he himself was a product of the Soviet Union. It was unrealistic for him to completely abandon the Soviet ideology and replace it with Russian nationalism. On the other hand, as a product of the Soviet Union, it was also difficult, especially since in Gorbachev's childhood, he experienced the great famine of 1932 and the cruelty of the Great Purge era. His grandfathers on both sides were exiled to Siberia. So Gorbachev was also averse to strongman politics. Of course, choosing which option involves more than just a process of elimination. Gorbachev himself was an intellectual. He was a lawyer and also an agricultural scientist. This identity as an intellectual may also have destined him to take a mild path of reform.
The reforms were mainly in two aspects: openness and restructuring. So-called openness means abandoning previous speech control. Any issues, we put on the table and speak freely. The news media should be more open, and culture and art should be more free. Gorbachev hoped that through such relatively free social discussions, the flaws, problems and pathological knots of the Soviet system could be found, while also reflecting on the Soviet past. Perhaps through such openness, the Soviet people could regain confidence and get rid of the long-term indifference, actively participating in nation building. So-called restructuring means initiating reforms in the existing Soviet system in terms of politics, economy and law, with the aim of reducing bureaucratism, increasing the autonomy of workers' and peasants' enterprises, formulating complete laws, everything is permitted if not prohibited by law, so as to make the Soviet system more flexible. Of course, no matter how it is said, Gorbachev did not want Western-style democracy, pluralism or free market economy. That is to say, the original Soviet ideology would not be shaken, but Gorbachev was indeed trying to promote what he saw as a "fundamental transformation", not just a facelift of the existing system or extra wrapping like the previous leaders, nor was he cheating like them, closing his eyes and randomly fabricating reform achievements.
Of course, it goes without saying that if you want to play it for real, what awaited Gorbachev must be all kinds of resistance, and comprehensive strong resistance. The first were the Soviet power brokers, mainly the over 400 Central Committee members. They were worried that openness and restructuring would lead to a decline in official authority. How could we not be able to speak effectively afterwards? Moreover, their opposition was more than just an attitude. They really took action, for example, deleting and revising Gorbachev's speeches, or uniting to veto Gorbachev's suggestions. Gorbachev had been pushing for non-Communists to hold important government positions, or inviting non-Communists to participate in the supplementary elections at all levels of government, which of course did not work out in the end. This showed that Gorbachev's power was actually quite limited. The second resistance came from the huge bureaucratic apparatus. At that time in the Soviet Union, there were 15.3 million officials in just the state economic institutions. They were also worried that reforms would cost them their jobs and privileges.
The third resistance was quite ruthless – the Soviet people. Due to long-term cynicism, almost no one believed that Gorbachev really wanted to accomplish something. Relying on experience and habit, the Soviets believed that Gorbachev was just like every new official who would make changes at the beginning. After the fire went out, things would be still the same. It was better to distribute more bread than talk grandly about reform. Even Gorbachev's natural allies, the educated youth and the broad intellectuals, held an indifferent wait-and-see attitude towards reform, and even believed that the reform would further deteriorate the situation. Here are two jokes that expressed doubts about the reform:
- Why did the meatballs become cube shaped?
- Restructuring.
- Why is it half cooked?
- Accelerate.
- Why is it bitter?
- Needs state approval.
- Why are you shamelessly telling me this?
- Glasnost (openness).
Gorbachev was addressing activists: We must make the transition from stagnation to rapid development. A voice rang out in the hall: We will work double shifts.
Gorbachev went on: We must complete comprehensive restructuring. The voice rang out again: We will work three shifts.
Gorbachev said: We will fulfil our international obligations.
Still the same voice: We will work day and night.
After the meeting, Gorbachev found the speaker and asked him: Comrade, where do you work? The man replied: I work at the crematorium.
This was the tremendous resistance Gorbachev faced. How many people still supported him in the Soviet Union? But it was impossible not to reform, so helplessly, Gorbachev could only start with small things, hoping to gradually change the situation. Thus came the later famous anti-alcohol campaign and other appeals conducive to social progress. Gorbachev hoped that through these small measures to change bad living habits, he could increase the enthusiasm and discipline of the Soviet people. Thus a series of minor jokes were born:
Bus announcement: This stop, the liquor store. Next stop, the end of the line for buying liquor.
A leader and his secretary were making love in the office. The leader said: Don't close the door, or people will think we are drinking here.
After Gorbachev issued the order to restrict alcohol, the only way to buy liquor was to line up at designated sales outlets. A Moscovite got tired of lining up and shouted: I'm going to the Kremlin to kill Gorbachev. Then he turned and left. After a while he came back, and the people next to him asked: Did you kill him already? He replied: Kill him? The line there is even longer than here!
A man came to a bar and shouted: A bottle of vodka! The waiter said: 10 rubles. The man was puzzled: Last time it was only 5 rubles, why is it 10 rubles this time? The waiter said: 5 rubles for the vodka, and another 5 rubles for the party's revolutionary fund. The man reluctantly handed 10 rubles to the waiter. Strangely, the waiter gave 5 rubles back to him. The man asked: Why are you giving me 5 rubles back? The waiter replied: The vodka is sold out.
From these jokes, we can see that even some reforms that were indeed beneficial to society were turned into targets of jokes by the Soviet people. Today, some look back at Gorbachev’s reforms and interpret the emergence of these jokes as the Soviets’ disapproval of his reforms, thus proving that the reforms were wrong. But I feel this interpretation is a bit far-fetched. In fact, the Soviets were neither supportive nor opposed. They still held a cynical attitude. You reform however you want, I'll tell my jokes. After all, we’ve spent decades like this. At most it was just suspicion and distrust. Of course, we must admit that Gorbachev did bring a whole new atmosphere to the Soviet Union. It can be said that before him, no Soviet leader like him had such a frank reflective attitude towards the country's own system. Especially his advocacy of "glasnost" (openness) really allowed the news media and the Soviet people to enjoy unprecedented freedom, forming a powerful political force that dealt a blow to political corruption in the Soviet Union. Here are two jokes that reflect this openness:
Q: What do ministers and flies have in common? A: They can both be killed with newspapers.
Gorbachev was on vacation with his wife Raisa at their dacha. In the morning, Gorbachev walked onto the balcony in his underwear to breathe fresh air. Raisa shouted: Dear, come back and put on your robe. Gorbachev was very puzzled: Dear, how can you see me through two rooms? Raisa said: I can't see you, I'm listening to Radio Liberty.
Undoubtedly, such openness was of course good, novel, and conducive to improving the political reality in the Soviet Union. But on the other hand, it was also because of the openness that when those tightly covered scandals were constantly exposed, it also became an important reason for the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Here is another classic train joke:
It is said that Soviet leaders were traveling by train. The tracks ended and the train was forced to stop.
Lenin called for: Immediately mobilize the proletariat for voluntary Saturday labor to fix the railway and go straight to communism.
Stalin solemnly ordered while puffing his pipe: Send me a million labor camp prisoners. If the railway is not fixed, execute them all.
Khrushchev banged his shoe and shouted: Connect the railway behind to the front and keep the train going.
Brezhnev waved his hands and said: Comrades, why don't we just pull down the curtains and rock our bodies in our seats to pretend the train is still moving forward.
Finally, Gorbachev pondered: Dismantle the train, reassemble it where there are tracks. And so, the Soviet Union disintegrated.
Jokes are jokes, and "openness" is absolutely not the fundamental reason for the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Truthfully speaking, "openness" did achieve some results, but in contrast, Gorbachev's "restructuring" did not have any "restructuring" effect at all, and was unable to save the doomed fate of the Soviet Union. The reasons lie in the fact that the reforms did not touch the fundamentals of the issues. The fundamental issue was the ossified Soviet ideology, including political, economic, social and all aspects, which had long been unable to meet the needs of the times. Without reforming ideology and achieving complete liberation of thought, any wonderful reform program would be too little too late. Soviet affairs expert David Satter once wrote: It is very difficult for a theological system to carry out doctrinal reforms. It was the same with Gorbachev. He tried to save and preserve a country heading towards decline because of such an ideology, without changing the ideology. No matter how hard he tried in the end, it could only be drawing water with a bamboo basket. It's like our show here, why doesn't it make money? Of course it is because of the form, the time is too long and the form is boring. But I don't change the form and start from the content, switching from popular science to humanities. It’s useless no matter how it's changed.
Therefore, no matter how Gorbachev himself gave his reforms bright new colors, essentially, they were no different from Stalin's "building socialism first in the Soviet Union" and Khrushchev's "achieving communism in twenty years”. As for the Soviets, they were already weary of this kind of top-down exhortation. The more Gorbachev portrayed the reform as a panacea to save the Soviet Union, the more the Soviets did not believe there could be such a good thing in the world. On the contrary, from the very beginning they believed that the reform could not achieve its goal and its failure was doomed. It was death without reform, and also death with reform. A Hungarian journalist told a joke:
I have a relative who asked the coroner what the cause of death was. The coroner replied: Because I dissected him.
In summary, the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era was already terminally ill. He himself pinned hopes on minor repairs without touching the fundamentals. Coupled with the disunity and pessimism of the Soviet people, the reforms ultimately led to the accelerated demise of the Soviet Union.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev himself also realized the reasons for the failure. Although he always believed that the Soviet system could be reformed, he still made this judgment: If the Russian people had followed the path of the February Revolution, if the country had continued with multiparty politics, the situation would have been completely different, and much better... The Bolsheviks' main mistake was that the violent means and methods they used for contingency were not temporary, but continued to be used... This was a model imposed on society by violence, a model of persecuting people by violence... Other countries also experienced industrialization like the Soviet Union, but they had basic rules and democracy. But in Russia, everything was experimented with bloodshed.
It can be said that this is a rare painful and frank reflection. Of course, Gorbachev was no longer the supreme leader of the Soviet Union at this point, and the Soviet Union no longer existed. But from the limited historical materials we can find that when he led the Soviet Union, he could indeed treat and understand folk political jokes without hostility, and even told jokes himself. In April 1988, when meeting with regional party secretaries, Gorbachev told a joke: The working class produced a lot of fine cognac, which all went into the bellies of the people representing them. In April 1987, when meeting with Polish leaders, Gorbachev also told a joke about being detached from reality: Two people were pushing a wheelbarrow and walking. Someone asked them why two people were needed to push it. They answered: Because the third person was on sick leave.
Not only that, we can even say that Soviet political jokes were one of the factors that prompted Gorbachev to carry out reforms. At that time, there were two theories of interpretation about political jokes. One theory believed that jokes were a "mini revolution" aimed at challenging political authority. The second theory believed that jokes were a safety valve for releasing popular resentment and helped prolong the rule of political repression. For Gorbachev, both theories were right. Although jokes were jokes, they also contained truth. They eventually became a basis for reform in public opinion. In 1989, Gorbachev met workers in the suburbs of Moscow. He said this: Political jokes are our salvation. Well, the series Soviet Jokes officially ends here. Although by the Gorbachev era, Soviet jokes had become faded and negligible, and although the Soviet Union had disappeared, as a popular culture and social culture, Soviet jokes will not disappear. Because it stems from power games, as long as power games continue, as long as violence and oppression still exist, political jokes will continue to emerge in new forms. And when we trace the origins and archetypes of political jokes, we will certainly speak of Soviet political jokes again.